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EXPATRIATION: AFROYIM V. RUSK AND ITS PROGENY
INTRODUCTION
Notwithstanding nearly 200 years of experience under the Con-
stitution and the conceded importance of the citizenship tie,1 Ameri-
cans have not yet arrived at a clear understanding of the law of expa-
triation. Confusion has arisen primarily because of the lack of termi-
nological clarity in this area of inquiry. "The word 'expatriation'
tends to be used indiscriminately, in both judicial discussion and popu-
lar speech, as comprehending all losses of national status, however
brought about."2 The most widely accepted definition of expatriation
is that it is the voluntary renunciation or relinquishment of citizen-
ship.8 However, every definition will reflect, in some degree, the inten-
tion of the person performing the expatriating act.4 Under the strictest
view of expatriation, a citizen can lose his citizenship only by making
an explicit, formal renunciation; the individual's intent to relinquish
citizenship is, therefore, express and deliberate.5 The most expansive
view of expatriation provides that a citizen can be divested of citizen-
ship voluntarily by performing acts, including, although not exclusively
an express, formal renunciation, which have been deemed by Congress
as evincing a relinquishment of citizenship; the individual's intent to
renounce his citizenship is inferred from such acts.6 The cases and
commentators generally have characterized both methods of relinquish-
ing one's citizenship under the rubric of voluntary expatriation. How-
ever, such terminology ignores subtle differences revolving around the
element of intent that exist between the two. Therefore, for purposes
of clarity, this article will only refer to an explicit, formal renuncia-
tion as voluntary expatriation.7 The voluntary performance of acts,
1. "Citizenship is man's basic right for it is nothing less than the right to have
rights." Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C. J., dissenting).
2. Maxey, Loss of Nationality: Individual Choice or Government Fiat?, 26 ALBANY
L. REv. 151 (1962).
3. Although this Comment concentrates on loss of citizenship, it should be noted
that there is a slight conceptual distinction between the terms "citizenship" and "na-
tionality." See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(21)-(22) (1970).
4. Note, "Voluntary Relinquishment" of American Citizenship: A Proposed De-
finition, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 325, 328 (1968).
5. Current provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 provide
machinery for an express, formal renunciation of citizenship. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481 (a) (6),
(7) (1970).
6. The intent to relinquish citizenship is inferred, e.g., when a citizen obtains
naturalization in a foreign state or takes an oath of allegiance to a foreign state. 8
U.S.C. §§ 1481(a)(1), (2) (1970).
7. In the context of this article, voluntariness will have two different but related
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falling short of an express renunciation, deemed by Congress as
evincing a relinquishment of citizenship will be characterized as in-
voluntary expatriation.
An individual may also lose his citizenship, irrespective of his ex-
pressed or inferred intent, by an act of the state of which he is a
citizen. Thus, a person may be involuntarily deprived of his citizen-
ship because he has performed acts whose legal effect is to produce loss
of citizenship, even though his intent in so acting is not to renounce
his citizenship but to accomplish other, unrelated results.8 The term
"denationalization" has generally been used to characterize such an
involuntary loss of citizenship. But denationalization can be viewed
more narrowly as the involuntary loss of citizenship pursuant to an
implied power of Congress to effect an end which is within Congress'
power to achieve.9 Since Congress determines which acts, short of
explicit, formal renunciations, evince involuntary expatriation and
which acts result in denationalization pursuant to this implied power,
there is really little difference between these two types of loss of citizen-
ship provisions.10 Therefore, unless stated otherwise this article will
refer to any involuntary loss of citizenship, i.e., where the citizen does
not specifically and expressly renounce his citizenship, as involuntary
expatriation.
During the 18th and 19th centuries, the right of an American
citizen to expatriate himself was a matter of some controversy, and it
was not until 1868 that Congress declared that expatriation was a
natural and inherent right of every person." Although the primary
purpose of the Act of 1868 was to protect naturalized Americans from
the claims of their countries of origin, the statutory language came to
be regarded as establishing the right of American citizens to renounce
their citizenship.'2 However, the statute did not provide any specific
meanings: it will denote not only an expressed intent to relinquish citizenship but also
the capacity to make a free and unfettered choice in performing the act of expatriation.
8. Maxey, supra note 2, at 152. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
provides, e.g., that an individual loses his citizenship by departing from or remaining
outside of the United States during wartime for the purpose of evading training and
service in the armed forces. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (10) (1970).
9. Comment, Afroyim v. Rusk, 17 BUFFALO L. REv. 925, 927 n.23 (1968).
10. "Supporting this contention is the failure of Congress, when it enacted the
Nationality Act of 1940, to make this distinction when it interwove the two types of
loss of citizenship provisions into one statute." Id.
11. Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223.
12. Comment, Formal Renunciation of United States Citizenship to Avoid Crim-
inal Liability Under Selective Service Law Constitutes a Voluntary Relinquishment of
Nationality Within the Meaning of Afroyim v. Rusk, 71 COLum. L. REV. 1532, 1533
(1971).
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method for exercising that right. Finally, in 1907, Congress guaranteed
effective exercise of the right of expatriation by American citizens. 18
The concept of involuntary expatriation also appeared for the first
time in the Act of 1907 when Congress provided for the expatriation
of a person upon his voluntary performance of certain acts statutorily
defined as grounds for loss of citizenship.14 Through the Nationality
Act of 194015 and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,11
Congress greatly expanded the grounds for involuntarily expatriating
American citizens. With few exceptions, 17 the constitutionality of
these statutory enactments was not seriously questioned by the Supfeme
Court until 1958.
Perez v. Brownell,18 decided in 1958, represented the beginning
of the Supreme Court's contemporary encounter with the issue of
involuntary expatriation. In a 5 to 4 decision, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of section 401 (e) of the Nationality Act of 1940,
which provided for the expatriation of American citizens who voted
in foreign elections. The Court held that the implied power of
Congress to regulate foreign affairs was sufficient to validate this section.
Thereafter, however, the Court began to assault the concept of in-
voluntary expatriation by declaring unconstitutional various sections
of the loss of citizenship provisions of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 and its predecessor statute, the Nationality Act of 1940.19
In Afroyim v. Rusk,20 decided in 1967, the Supreme Court con-
tinued this decade-long trend by stating, in another 5 to 4 decision,
that a United States citizen has "a constitutional right 'to remain a
citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizen-
ship."21 In so deciding, the Court expressly overruled the specific hold-
13. Act of March 2, 1907. ch. 2534, 34 Stat. 1228.
14. Marsh, The Supreme Court and the Power of Congress to Expatriate-
From the Objective to the Subjective Test of Voluntariness: A Shift in Predominance,
22 Sw. L.J. 466 (1968).
15. Ch. 876, §§ 401-10, 54 Stat. 1168-71 (1940).
16. Oh. 477, §§ 349-57, 66 Stat. 267-72 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-
1503 (1970).
17. See generally Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939); Mackenzie v. Hare, 239
U.S. 299 (1915).
18. 356 U.S.i44 (1958).
19. See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. 144 (1963); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). But see United States ex
rel. Marks v. Esperdy, 377 U.S. 214 (1964), where the Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of § 349(a) (3) of the 1952 Act providing for the expatriation of a person
who served in fthe armed f6rces of a foreign state without the prior consent of the
United States secretaries of state and defense.
20. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
21. Id. at 268.
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ing in Perez as well as the broad principles underlying that decision.
In Afroyim, the Court invalidated section 401 (e) of the Nationality
Act of 1940, rejected foreign policy considerations as grounds for ex-
patriation, and ruled that Congress can never deprive an American
citizen of his citizenship involuntarily.
Although Afroyim clarified somewhat the confused position of
citizenship and expatriation within the framework of the Constitu-
tion,22 the doctrine and principles to be derived from that decision
are still unclear. Certainly, Afroyim would seem to mean no less
than that the fourteenth amendment forbids Congress from depriving
an American of his citizenship when he has not intended voluntarily
to relinquish it. However, subsequent lower court cases, 23 a Statement
of Interpretation issued by the Attorney General 24 delineating Afroyim's
effect, and interpretive guidelines issued by the Department of State
and the Immigration and Naturalization Service 25 for adjudication of
cases affected by Afroyim indicate that Afroyim leaves open the ques-
tion of exactly what actions will be deemed to constitute a voluntary
relinquishment of citizenship. Although the citizen's right to ex-
patriate himself remains unchallenged, it is still debatable whether
voluntary relinquishment can only be effectuated by an explicit, formal
renunciation of American citizenship or whether it can be brought
about by the uncoerced commission of an act, short of an express re-
nunciation, which has been deemed by law as evincing a relinquish-
ment of citizenship. Furthermore, a recently decided Supreme Court
case, Rogers v. Bellei,26 has declared that only certain citizens are pro-
tected by the fourteenth amendment's citizenship clause,2 7 while other
citizens are not afforded this protection by reason of the circumstances
of their birth, thus subjecting the latter category to involuntary ex-
patriation.28 In essence, Bellei simply limits the scope of the Afroyim
rule against involuntary expatriation to native-born and naturalized
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. As originally adopted, the Constitution's only
specific grant of power given to Congress was "[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Nat-
uralization." Today, with the exception of the fourteenth amendment, there is no
reference in the Constitution to the status and rights of citizenship nor is there any
express constitutional provision regarding the loss of citizenship.
23. See King v. Rogers, 463 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1972); Jolley v. Immigration
& Naturalization Serv., 441 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1971) ; Peter v. Secretary of State, 347
F. Supp. 1035 (D.D.C. 1972); In re Balsamo, 306 F. Supp. 1028 (N.D. Ill, 1969);
Baker v. Rusk, 296 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
24. 34 Fed. Reg. 1079 (1969).
25. Dep't of State Circular Airgram CA-2855, May 16, 1969.
26. 421 U.S. 815 (1971).
27. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
28. See text accompanying notes 194-224 infra.
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citizens. But it also is a decided retreat from the doctrinal approach
set forth in Afroyim that had held involuntary expatriation to be ex-
pressly beyond the powers of Congress. Furthermore, and possibly most
important, Bellei seems to reflect a policy change on the part of the
Court which leaves the entire issue of voluntary relinquishment of
citizenship seriously in doubt.
This Comment traces the evolution of the law of expatriation
which culminated in Afroyim v. Rusk, and explores the meaning and
implications of that decision in the light of subsequent administrative
and judicial developments. Although an analysis of the history' of
expatriation is a prerequisite to understanding Afroyim, this paper will
principally be directed at the Afroyim decision, and to post-Afroyim
developments. These developments in the law of expatriation indicate
that Afroyim is rather limited in its scope and import. In particular,
it is suggested that Bellei unnecessarily undermines the proposition
that the first sentence of the fourteenth amendment defines the total
range of American citizenship, and that a statutory response to that
decision would be most appropriate.
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EXPATRIATION
In Roman law, the right of a citizen to renounce his allegiance
to the state was firmly established. 29 However, in the early English
common law, the citizen had no right to expatriate himself. Under the
principle of perpetual allegiance, the English citizen, through his own
conduct, could not change his allegiance even with the sovereign's
consent. 80
Soon after the American colonies broke their ties with England,
the question was raised whether American citizens had a right to
expatriate.8 1 Although some doubt was expressed as to whether the
English common law doctrine of perpetual allegiance was part of the
American common law heritage,32 the federal judiciary nevertheless
29. Maxey, supra note 2, at 153.
30. Marsh, supra note 14, at 467. The dbctrine of perpetual allegiance survived
in England until 1870 when Parliament enacted legislation which permitted British sub-
jects to lose their citizenship upon naturalization in a foreign state. Maxey, supra note
2, at 154-55.
31. Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795).
32. In Juando v. Taylor, 13 F. Cas. 1179 (No. 7558) (S.D.N.Y. 1818), the court
held that:
[i]n this country, expatriation is conceived to be a fundamental right. As
1976]
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applied the doctrine because of the absence of any congressional ex-
pression on the subject.33 The Supreme Court dodged the issue of
whether citizens had the right to expatriate themselves by simply re-
fusing to express an opinion directly on the subject. 4 However, as
early as 1795, the Supreme Court did seem to indicate that the in-
dividual possessed the right to relinquish his citizenship voluntarily; 85
the only doubt expressed by the Court was in determining the manner
in which the right was to be exercised.36 The Court thus indicated the
need for a statute to resolve doubts as to the manner in which expa-
triation might be effectuated. Efforts in Congress in 1808 and 1817
to enact legislation providing for expatriation proved unsuccessful, and
the matter was not seriously considered again until 1868. In that year,
as a result of Great Britain's continued refusal to recognize the shed-
ding of allegiance by naturalized Americans who were formerly of
British nationality, Congress enacted legislation which put this nation
on record as rejecting the doctrine of perpetual allegiance and asserting
the international validity of the naturalization process and the right
of all persons to expatriate themselvesY
Although admirable in its purpose, this unilateral action by the
Congress did not provide any specific method for domestically exer-
cising the right voluntarily to expatriate, and could not, of course, bind
other nations to this congressional pronouncement. Accordingly, the
United States began negotiating bilateral treaties with various nations
to protect the status of its naturalized citizens on a reciprocal basis in
an effort to reduce or eliminate the conflicting claims of different
sovereignties arising out of dual nationality.38 Although provisions of
these treaties differed, they generally provided that residence by the
far as the principles maintained, and the practice adopted by the govern-
ment of the United States is evidence of its existence, it is fully recognized.
Id. at 1181. However, according to Maxey, supra note 2, at 161 n.57, this was the only
unequivocal judicial declaration in support of this right.
33. See, e.g., William's Case, 29 F. Cas. 1330, 1331 (No. 17,708) (C.C.D. Conn.
1799).
34. See, e.g., Inglis v. Trustees of the Sailor's Snug Harbour, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.)
99, 120 (1830); The Santissima Trinidad & the St. Ander, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283,
347-48 (1822); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 120-21
(1804).
35. Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 162 (1795).
36. Id. at 162-63.
37. Act of July 27, 1868, 15 Stat. 223.
38. Dual nationality is generally agreed to be an undesirable status since an in-
dividual subject to the conflicting allegiances of two states will cause himself to be
burdened with the responsibilities and obligations of two citizenships. Not surprisingly,
this will often serve as a source of friction between the two nations.
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naturalized citizen in his original nation without the intent to return
to the United States shall be deemed a renunciation of his acquired
citizenship, and, further, that the intent not to return may be deemed
to exist when the naturalized person resides continually in his mother
country for more than two years.39
During the remainder of the 19th century, the executive and
judicial branches of government recognized that although the Act of
1868 did affirm the right of American citizens to expatriate, 40 there
existed no systematized procedure by which such persons could re-
linquish their American citizenship. Several presidents, recognizing
their own lack of authority to expatriate and the paucity of authorita-
tive judicial decisions on the subject, urged Congress to define specifi-
cally the acts by which citizens should be held to have expatriated
themselves. For many years, however, Congress resisted these presi-
dential urgings for a more precise definition of expatriating acts be-
cause it believed that it had already met the problem in a meaningful
fashion when it enacted the Act of 1868.41 Finally, in 1907, Congress
took official notice of the shortcomings of its prior legislation and en-
acted the first general statute to specify acts of expatriation.4
The Expatriation Act of 1907 provided for loss of citizenship only,
(1) by naturalization in a foreign state, (2) by taking an oath of al-
legiance to a foreign state, (3) by an American woman's marriage to a
foreigner, and, (4) by residence abroad by a naturalized citizen for a
specified number of years (such residence abroad only giving rise to a
presumptive loss of citizenship which could be rebutted by evidence of
acts indicating attachment to the United States).43 As these pro-
visions indicate, the primary emphasis in the law of expatriation had
shifted since 1868 from the original function of providing a means
whereby a citizen might intentionally divest himself of dual nationality,
to its "use as a sanction by government to discourage or even punish
39. See, e.g., Convention Establishing the Status of Naturalized Citizens Who
Again Take Up Their Residence in the Country of Their Origin, Aug. 13, 1906, 37
Stat. 1653, 1655, T.S. No. 575 (1906).
40. For a time, some doubt was expressed as to whether the legislative enactment
of 1868 merely affirmed the right of foreign nationals to expatriate and become na-
turalized American citizens. Roche, The Expatriation Cases: "Breathes There the Man,
With Soul So Dead . . .?," 1963 SuP. CT. REv. 325, 330. Eventually, the statutory
language came to be regarded as establishing the right of American citizens to ex-
patriate and become naturalized in a foreign country. Id.
41. Maxey, supra note 2, at 162.
42. Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2534, 34 Stat. 1228.
43. Id.
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various forms of proscribed conduct." 44 By specifically setting forth
certain acts which would result in the expatriation of a citizen even
against his expressed will, Congress had given, for the first time, its
official approval to the concept of involuntary expatriation.
Following the congressional decision to use expatriation for puni-
tive and regulatory purposes, the expatriation statutes began to be
subjected to judicial scrutiny.4 The constitutionality of the 1907 Act
was first tested in the landmark case of Mackenzie v. Hare,40 in which
the Supreme Court upheld the power of Congress to expatriate, during
the period of coverture, an American woman who had married a
British national and taken on British citizenship. The Court based
its decision on Congress' implied power of sovereignty in foreign
affairs.47 Although indicating that a "change of citizenship cannot be
arbitrarily imposed, that is, imposed without the concurrence of the
citizen," 48 the Court inferred assent from the fact that the expatriating
act had been "voluntarily entered into, with notice of the conse-
quences." 49 By enlarging the meaning of voluntariness and by disre-
garding the citizen's actual intent, the Court was able to turn what had
previously been assumed to be an involuntary expatriation into a
voluntary one. However, the Court did not expressly declare involun-
tary expatriation as being among Congress' powers; rather, it has been
suggested that the Court merely held that expatriation must be volun-
tary and that Congress has the power to declare that the commission of
specified acts shall be conclusively deemed ot be voluntary expatria-
tion.50
I The concept of expatriation was further defined in Perkins v.
Elg.51 The Court there held that a native-born citizen retained her
American citizenship despite the acquisition of a second nationality.
This dual nationality resulted from operation of Swedish law when
she was taken to Sweden, before she reached the age of majority, by
her Swedish-born parents. The Court stated that "[e]xpatriation is
the voluntary renunciation or abandonment of nationality and al-
legiance." 62 The Court reasoned that since section 2 of the Expatria-
44. Comment, supra note 12, at 1533.
45. Id. at 1534.
46. 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
47. Id. at 311.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 311-12.
50. Comment, Afroyim v. Rusk: A Right to Citizenship?, 4 CALIF. WESTERN L.
RPv. 157, 160 (1968).
51. 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
52. Id. at 334.
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tion Act of 190753 was aimed at voluntary expatriation and since Elg
had neither made any statement renouncing her citizenship nor volun-
tarily performed any act indicating an abandonment of nationality or
a transfer of allegiance, she could not be held to have expatriated her-
self. However, the Court noted that an American citizen could be in-
voluntarily expatriated through the operation of a treaty or statute.
"As at birth she became a citizen of the United States, that citizenship
must be deemed to continue unless she has been deprived of it through
the operation of a treaty or congressional enactment or by her volun-
tary action in conformity with applicable legal principles." 54 In retro-
spect, this comment seemed to give the judicial imprimatur to the
expatriation of the unwilling citizen.
Judicial and administrative experience with the Act of 1907 soon
demonstrated that it was unsatisfactory in dealing with the issue of
expatriation. The legislation was thought to be deficient for several
reasons: it was not explicit enough; 55 it permitted too much adminis-
trative discretion; 56 and it failed to deal effectively with recurrent prob-
lems of dual nationality.57 Congress' recognition that the statute had
major shortcomings and its belief that there was a need to substantially
increase the number of actions which, when performed voluntarily,
would result in the automatic loss of American citizenship led ulti-
mately to the Nationality Act of 1940.58 Although the statute did not
introduce any significant changes concerning the right of voluntary
expatriation, it did establish new criteria in the area of involuntary
expatriation.59
The Act stipulated that native-born and naturalized citizens would
lose their citizenship by,
(1) obtaining naturalization in a foreign state; (2) taking an. oath
53. Section 2 of the Expatriation Act of 1907 provides: "[t]hat any American
citizen shall be deemed to have expatriated himself when he has been naturalized in any
foreign state in conformity with its laws
54. 307 U.S. at 329.
55. The legislation did not categorically state that there were no other ,.'ays of
losing American citizenship except those prescribed therein. Maxey, supra note 2, at 168.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 169.
58. Ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1138-74 (1940). The increased number of statutory pro-
visions can probably best be explained by the stress and increased security-consciousness
caused by the onset of World War II, as well as by the reversal of America's traditional
"open door" immigration policy, which led to stricter requirements for the acquisition
and retention of American citizenship. Duvall, Expatriation Under United States Law,
Perez to Afroyim: The Search for a Philosophy of American Citizenship, 56 VA. L. R.v.
408, 415-16 (1970).
59. Comment, supra note 9, at 928.
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of allegiance to a foreign state; (3) entering or serving in the armed
forces of a foreign state while a national thereof without legal au-
thorization; (4) holding any office, post, or employment in the
government of a foreign state or any subdivision thereof; (5) voting
in a political election in a foreign state; (6) formal renunciation
before a United States diplomatic or consular officer in a foreign
state; (7) formal renunciation in the United States approved by the
Attorney General during wartime; (8) court martial conviction and
discharge from the armed forces for desertion during wartime; (9)
court martial or civil court conviction for treason, attempting by
force to overthrow, or bearing arms against the United States; and,
(10) departing from or remaining outside of the United States during
wartime for the purpose of evading training and service in the armed
forces.60
Additional provisions provided that a national born abroad would lose
his citizenship by, (11) failing to take up permanent residence in the
United States before attaining 16 years of age, subject to certain ex-
ceptions; 61 and a naturalized citizen would lose his citizenship by, (12)
fraudulent naturalization;6 2 and by, (13) residing continuously for
three years in the foreign state of birth or for five years in any other
foreign state, with certain exceptions.63
The post-World War II climate and the hyper-security-conscious-
ness that stemmed from the cold war led to the passage of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act of 1952.04 This Act continued, with
certain modifications, the provisions of the 1940 Act relative to loss
of nationality; however, it added a provision for the expatriation of
citizens who acquired dual nationality at birth and voluntarily sought
or claimed the benefits of their foreign nationality and resided in the
foreign state for three consecutive years after the age of 22.5
The Expatriation Act of 195466 amended the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 by adding certain crimes, including rebellion
and insurrection, seditious conspiracy and advocacy of the overthrow
of the government in any manner proscribed by law, to the list of
expatriative acts. It is therefore not surprising that by 1954 one com-
60. Ch. 876, §§ 401(a)-(h), 54 Stat. 1168 (1940), as amended, 8 U.S.C. §§
1481(a) (1)-(10) (1970).
61. Ch. 876, § 201, 54 Stat. 1138 (1940), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (23
age limit) (1970).
62. Ch. 876, § 338, 54 Stat. 1158 (1940), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (1970).
63. Ch. 876, § 404, 54 Stat. 1170 (1940), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1484 (1970).
64. Ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1970).
65. 8 U.S.C. § 1482 (1970).
66. Ch. 1256, § 2, 68 Stat. 1146 (1954).
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mentator was moved to note: "From the day when people believed
in the English doctrine of immutable allegiance, to the time when we
merely declared that a person had a right to cast off his citizenship,
we proceeded to a point at which our statutory laws provided more
grounds than any other country in the world for loss of citizenship.*'67
In an attempt to soften the harsh consequences which result from
expatriation, 8 certain procedural changes have been made by both
judicial and administrative authorities. For example, the courts have
determined that due process requires that the performance of an act
deemed expatriating be voluntary. Duress and oppressive factors which
inhibit a free and intelligent decision to renounce citizenship protect
against loss of citizenship. More specifically, threats of loss of civil
rights,69 jail °70 concentration camp,71 or fear of physical reprisals: t6
oneself or one's family,1 2 have all been declared complete defenses
to expatriation. The Attorney General has also ruled that in the
absence of clear and compelling statutory language he would be "un-
willing to attribute to Congress an intention that the United States
citizenship of an individual should be forfeited by reason of actions
taken at a time when he was unaware of his citizenship."73
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has determined that the rule of
construction to be followed in loss of nationality cases is that the law
and facts are to be construed as far as reasonably possible in favor of
retaining citizenship.74 In this regard, the Supreme Court imposed
upon the Government the burden of proving both the act 75 and in'
voluntariness76 by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence. How-
ever, because this burden of proof was so burdensome, Congress, in
1961, relaxed it by providing that when loss of citizenship is put in
issue, such loss may be established by a preponderance of the evidence,
67. UNITED NATIONS, LAWS CONCERNING NATIONALITy 518, 519 (United Nations
Legislative Series 1954), noted in, Note, Problems of the Foreign-Born Citizen: Rogers
v. Bellei, 11 COLUA. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 304, 307 (1972).
68. An individual who has lost his citizenship without having acquired another
will be rendered stateless. Since a stateless person is not considered a national by any
state and is therefore unable to secure the protection of his rights in either the do-
mestic or international sphere, he is subject to severe perils at all times. Note, supra
note 4, at 330.
69. Soccodato v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
70. Kamada v. Dulles, 145 F. Supp. 457 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
71. Dos Reis ex rel. Camara v. Nicolls, 161 F.2d 860 (1st Cir. 1947).
72. Schioler v. Secretary of State, 175 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1949).
73. Freddie Norman Chatty-Suarez, 9 I & N. Dec. 670 (Att'y Gen. 1962).
74. See Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 134 (1958); Schneiderman v. Unitect
States, 320 U.S. 118, 122 (1943).
75. Gonzales v. Landon, 350 U.S. 920 (1955) (per curiam).
76. Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958).
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with the burden of proving the commission of the act of expatriation
placed upon the Government.77 Of course, even when it is established
that an act of expatriation has been performed, the individual may
prevent expatriation by proving that the act was committed involun-
t rily. However, in 1961, Congress also provided that when volun-
tariness of .action is put in issue, there is a presumption of voluntari-
ness. Although this presumption may be rebutted by a preponderance
of the evidence, the burden of proving involuntariness is placed upon
the person who performed the expatriative act.78
It was not until 1958 that the Supreme Court squarely faced the
question of whether Congress could enact a law stripping an American
of his citizenship which he had never expressly and voluntarily re-
linquished. In Perez v. Brownell,79 the petitioner was a native-born
American citizen 0 who had resided in Mexico for a number of years
and had voted in several Mexican political elections. Upon his return
to the United States, he was ordered excluded on the ground that he
had expatriated himself, pursuant to section 401 (e) of the Nationality
Act of 1940.81
The Supreme Court, by a 5 to 4 margin, upheld the Congress in
withdrawing citizenship from a native-born national for having voted
in a foreign political election. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the
majority,s2 concluded that "in making voting in foreign elections
(among other behavior) an act of expatriation, Congress was seeking
to effectuate its power to regulate foreign affairs."83 The Court agreed
that the Government has an implied power to legislate for the effec-
tive regulation of foreign affairs under the necessary and proper clause
of the Constitution. 4 The only limitation on congressional powers
77. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(c)(1970).
78. Id. There is conclusive presumption of voluntariness when an expatriative
act has been performed by a naturalized American citizen who has been physically
present in his mother country for at least ten years immediately prior to the com-
mission of the act. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(b) (1970).
79. 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
80. The Court seemed to presume, without any comment, that Perez possessed
dual nationality: American, because of his birth in America, and Mexican, because
-of his birth to Mexican parents. Id. at 46.
81. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) (1970).
82. Justice Frankfurter was joined by Justices Burton, Clark, Harlan and Bren-
nan.
83. 356 U.S. at 57.
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. "To make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any De-
Ipartment or Officer thereof."
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that the Court acknowledged was the necessity of finding a "rational
nexus" between these powers and the legislation to effectuate them. 5
In other words, due process required that "the means-in this case,
withdrawal of citizenship-must be reasonably related to the end-
here, regulation of foreign affairs."8 6 Given such an expansive test,'the
Court found little difficulty in upholding the validity of the provisdon.
Justice Frankfurter denied that the power of Congress to termi-
nate citizenship depended on the citizen's consent or that the conduct
to which loss of citizenship attached had to be such that it amountedto
an abandonment of citizenship or a transfer of allegiance.8 7 Furthdf-
more, the Court noted, in a footnote, that the fourteenth amendment
neither proscribes nor restricts the power of Congress to'unilaterally
withdraw citizenship.8  Although "undivided allegiance'-' was not th'e
standard proposed by Justice Frankfurter, he did note, however, in an
almost parenthetical manner, that "the fact is not without significance
that Congress has interpreted this conduct, not irrationally, as imn-
porting not only something less than complete and unswerving al-
legiance to the United States, but also elements of an allegianceto
another country in some measure, at least, inconsistent with American
citizenship."8 9 Little did Justice Frankfurter realize at the time that
these words would subsequently be used to narrow the test which 'he
had himself proposed.
In a vigorous dissent, Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justices
Black and Douglas, categorically denied that citizenship could 136
terminated subject to the general powers of Congress. The Chief
Justice maintained that the first sentence of the fourteenth amend
ment affords absolute protection of the citizenship which it defines.90
Although he denied that Congress has the power to divest an American
of his citizenship, he did, however, concede that under certain circum-
stances a citizen might "be found to have abandoned his status by
voluntarily performing acts that compromise his undivided allegiaince
to his country."91 Nevertheless, he felt that section 401 (e) was over-
85. 356 U.S. at 58.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 61-62.
88. Id. at 58 n.3.
89. Id. at 60-61.
90. "The basic constitutional provision crystallizing the right of citizenship is the
first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 65. "The Fourteenth Amendment
recognizes that this priceless right is immune from the exercise of governmental powers."
Id. at 77-78 (dissenting opinion).
91. Id. at 78.
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broad in so far as it covered situations not limited "to those that may
rationally be said to constitute an abandonment of citizenship."0 12
Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, wrote a separate dis-
senting opinion, 93 in which he also strongly maintained that the right
to citizenship guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment prohibited
Congress from divesting an American of citizenship.94 And like Chief
Justice Warren, he acknowledged that a person may voluntarily re-
linquish his citizenship by performing certain acts which fall short of
an express, explicit renunciation. 95 However, Justice Douglas' opinion
differs somewhat from the Chief Justice's in the extent to which he
felt that Congress could classify certain kinds of conduct as being the
basis for voluntary relinquishment.96 Not only must the citizen per-
form an act which evinces an abandonment of allegiance to this coun-
try, but the performance of such an act must also indicate a transfer
of that loyalty to another. 7 In sum, although he agreed that Congress
can prescribe conditions for voluntary relinquishment of citizenship, it
was his belief that "Congress cannot turn white to black and make any
act an act of expatriation."98s
In Trop v. Dulles,99 decided the same day as Perez, the Supreme
Court began a decade-long trend, culminating in Afroyim v. Rush, 100
of limiting Congress' expatriation powers. In Trop, a native-born
American citizen had been convicted of desertion during World War
II. Upon his return to the United States, his application for a pass-
port was denied because under the provisions of section 401 (h) of the
Nationality Act of 1940,101 he had lost his citizenship by reason of his
92. Id. at 76.
93. Justice Whittaker wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which he substan-
tially agreed with the approach taken by Chief Justice Warren.
94. "[Ihe grant of citizenship by the Fourteenth Amendment is clear and ex-
plicit and should withstand any invasion of the legislative power." 356 U.S. at 82.
95. "[T]he waiver [of the right of citizenship] must be first a voluntary act and
second an act consistent with a surrender of the right granted." Id. at 83.
96. There might in fact be no difference of opinion since Chief Justice Warren,
in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), used language almost identical to that used
by Justice Douglas in his Perez dissent. See note 105 infra & accompanying text.
97.
[Section] 401 (e) does not require that his act have a sufficient relation-
ship to the relinquishment of citizenship-nor a sufficient quality of adhearing
to a foreign power. Nor did his voting abroad have that quality.
Id. at 83.
98. Id. at 84.
99. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
100. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
101. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(8) (1970).
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conviction for desertion and consequent dishonorable discharge. The
Court, again by a 5 to 4 margin, declared the statute unconstitutional.
Chief Justice Warren, in a plurality opinion,10 2 stated two grounds
of unconstitutionality. First, he repeated what he had noted in his
dissent in Perez:
[Ojitizenship is not subject to the general powers of the National
Government and therefore cannot be divested in the exercise of those
powers. The right may be voluntarily relinquished or abandoned
either by express language or by language and conduct that show a
renunciation of citizenship. 103
Under these principles, the Court held that Trop had not lost his
citizenship. Desertion in wartime does not indicate a dilution of al-
legiance to this country 0 4 However, in language reminiscent of that
used by Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion in Perez, Chief Jus-
tice Warren also noted that desertion in wartime "does not neces-
sarily signify allegiance to a foreign state."' 05 The necessary corollary
to this proposition was that the Court determined that section 401 (h)
was overbroad since it was not expressly limited to cases of desertion to
the enemy. Second, based on Perez, the Chief Justice went on to state
that even if the government had the power to take away citizenship
irrespective of the person's intent, expatriation as a penalty for de-
sertion was a "cruel and unusual" punishment proscribed by the eighth
amendment since it forced Trop into a situation of statelessness 06
Chief Justice Warren's opinion, although emphasizing the con-
cept of allegiance, clearly was based on the eighth amendment. This
was apparently done to form a consensus which would otherwise have
been impossible to obtain had the Court decided the case exclusively
on the basis of "dilution of allegiance."
Justice Frankfurter, for the minority, 0 7 declared that there was
no warrant for the Court's labeling the disability imposed by section
401 (h) as a "punishment."' 08 Moreover, even assuming that section
102. Chief Justice Warren was joined by Justices Black, Douglas, and Whittaker.
Justices Brennan and Black each wrote concurring opinions, with Justice Douglas
joining in Justice Black's.
103. 356 U.S. at 92.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 101. The Chief Justice characterized the practice of expatriation in
such circumstances as being "a form of punishment more primitive than torture . ..
Id.
107. Justice Frankfurter was joined by Justices Burton, Clark, and Harlan.
108. Id. at 125 n.1 (dissenting opinion). Justice Frankfurter gave two reasons
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401 (h) does amount to "punishment," he maintained that "to insist
that denationalization is cruel and unusual punishment is to stretch
that concept beyond the breaking point."'10 9 Furthermore, he argued
that there was a "rational nexus" between the withdrawal of citizen-
ship and Congress' war power: failure to denationalize a citizen who
had refused to perform one of the duties of citizenship would lessen
morale in the armed forces." 0
Justice Brennan, casting the pivotal vote, distinguished Perez, in
which he had been a member of the majority. Trop, unlike Perez,
presented a statute without a relevant connection to the congressional
power exercised. Justice Brennan noted that expatriation is not a
means reasonably calculated to achieve the legitimate congressional end
of dealing with the problem of desertion from the armed forces."'
As a result, he could not "see that this [provision] is anything other
than forcing retribution from the offender-naked vengeance.""12 Jus-
tice Brennan's concurring opinion is particularly noteworthy because
of his comment that the type of conduct involved in Perez, unlike that
in Trop, "imports 'elements of an allegiance to another country in
some measure inconsistent with American citizenship.' ,,18 Although
the quotation is from Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion in Perez,
it does not appear to be much different from the standard proposed
by Chief Justice Warren in his Perez (dissenting) and Trop (plu-
rality) opinions, and seems to signify, therefore, the forming of a ma-
jority built around the factor of allegiance.
The next major Supreme Court case involving Congress' power
to involuntarily expatriate was Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez."4 This
decision involved two native-born American citizens, one of whom
possessed dual nationality, who were held to have lost their American
citizenship pursuant to section 401 (j) of the Nationality Act of 1940, 1r
by remaining outside the jurisdiction of the United States in time of
for this conclusion: first, there are legislative ends within the scope of Congress' war
power that are wholly consistent with a "non-penal" purpose to regulate the military
forces; second, neither the statutory language nor the legislative history of the enact-
ment indicate that Congress had a contrary purpose.
109. Id. at 125 n.2.
110. Id. at 120-21. Justice Frankfurter, incidentally, did not speak in Trop in
terms of any dilution of allegiance, as he had, albeit parenthetically, in Perez.
111. Id. at 114 (concurring opinion).
112. Id. at 112.
113. 356 U.S. 86, 107 (1958).
114. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). Rusk v. Gort was consolidated with Kennedy v. Men-
doza-Martinez.
115. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(10) (1970).
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war for the purpose of avoiding military service. Although a constitu-
tional challenge was leveled against this statutory provision, Justice
'Goldberg, writing for the majority,"" never reached the issue of
whether Congress could exercise the power of expatriation without the
consent of the citizen-the issue raised in Perez-because he deter-
mined that expatriation, as applied in these two situations, was an un-
constitutionally imposed punishment due to the absence of the pro-
cedural safeguards provided by the fifth and sixth amendments.117
Justices Douglas and Black reiterated the position they took in
Perez. Justice Brennan, concurring, seemed to retreat even further
from the approach to which he acceded in Perez by noting that he now
had some doubts about the correctness of that decision;" 8 he did not,
however, state exactly what those reservations were. Justice Stewart,
dissenting," 9 applied the "rational nexus" test first proposed in Perez.
However, he narrowed the test by noting that all of the previous cases
upholding expatriation had involved "conduct inconsistent with undi-
luted allegiance to this country."'2 0 This qualified "rational nexus"
test would seem to permit the imposition of loss of citizenship incident
to the general powers of Congress only where the proscribed conduct
imports some dilution of allegiance. This view is similar to that ex-
pressed by Chief Justice Warren in his dissenting opinion in Perez,
in which he said that citizenship may be renounced voluntarily not
only by an expressed renunciation but also by other actions in dero-
gation of undivided allegiance to this country. 2 1
In Schneider v. Rusk,12 2 decided in 1964, the Supreme Court
shifted still further away from Perez. Mrs. Schneider, who emigrated
from Germany as a child, acquired American citizenship at the time
her parents were naturalized. She subsequently married a German na-
tional and resided in Germany for more than three years. Her citizen-
ship was revoked under section 352 (a) (1) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952,123 which provides that a naturalized citizen
loses his citizenship by continual residence for three years in the coun-
try of origin.
116. Justice Goldberg was joined by Justices Douglas, Black, Brennan, and Chief
Justice Warren.
117. 372 U.S. at 167.
118. Id. at 187 (concurring opinion).
119. Justice Stewart was joined by Justices Clark, Harlan and White.
120. Id. at 214 (dissenting opinion).
121. 356 U.S. 44, 68 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
122. 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
123. 8 U.S.C. § 1484(a)(1) (1970).
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Justice Douglas, writing for the majority,2 4 stated that the ques-
tion before the Court was whether, "[tJhe means, withdrawal of citizen-
ship, [are] reasonably calculated to effect the end that is within the
power of Congress to achieve, the avoidance of embarrasment in the
conduct of our foreign relations."' 2 5 Although the issue was framed
in terms of Justice Frankfurter's "rational nexus" test, the answer
which he propounded was apparently grounded in terms of Chief
Justice Warren's "dilution of allegiance" test. Justice Douglas found
that the purpose of the statute was to reduce the country's burdens in
protecting Americans living abroad who bore little or no allegiance
to this country. However, he precluded an inquiry into whether Con-
gress had the power to effectively meet this problem by stating that the
provision was based on "the impermissible assumption that naturalized
citizens as a class are less reliable and bear less allegiance to this coun-
try than do the native born."''2 Consequently, the Court held that sec-
ion 352 (a) (1) worked an unwarranted discrimination against natur-
alized citizens, in violation of the equal protection guarantee embodied
in the due process clause of the fifth amendment.27
Justice Douglas seemed to align himself with the position taken
by Chief Justice Warren by stating that "[I]iving abroad, whether the
citizen be naturalized or native born, is no badge of lack of allegiance
and in no way evidences a voluntary renunciation of nationality and
allegiance."'2 However, although he readily accepted Justice Stew-
art's conclusion in Mendoza-Martinez that involuntary expatriation
must be based on a finding of lack of allegiance to this country,20
Justice Douglas strongly reaffirmed his view that Congress has no power
to withdraw citizenship, unless citizenship is voluntarily relinquished
or renounced.130 It appears, then, that although Perez had not yet been
formally repudiated, several Justices were masking over their own dif-
ferences and grouping together into a coalition which would soon deny,
or at least severely restrict, Congress' power to expatriate American
citizens against their will.
124. Justice Douglas was joined by Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Black,
Stewart, and Goldberg.
125. 377 U.S. at 166; cf. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 60 (1958).
126. 377 U.S. at 168.
127. Justice Douglas stated that his opinion was based solely on the fifth amend-
ment because the view that Congress lacked the power to destroy citizenship had not
yet commanded a majority of the entire Court.
128. 377 U.S. at 169.
129. Id. at 168.
130. Id. at 166.
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Justice Clark, joined by Justices White and Harlan, dissented.
He contended that, (1) Congress authorized expatriation as "the only
adequate remedy" to meet a problem of "the highest national impor-
tance"; (2) whatever "badge of allegiance" may be embodied in sec-
tion 352(a) (1), it was imposed on Mrs. Schneider "through her own
acts" in renouncing her derivative citizenship by choosing to live
permanently abroad in her native land of Germany; and, (3) if she
is a "second class citizen," it is by virtue not of congressional action, but
of her own conduct, "with her eyes open to the result."ul Justice
Clark said that the Court in Perez described the central issue in ex-
patriation cases "'as importing not only something less than complete
and unswerving allegiance to the United States but also elements of
an allegiance to another country in some measure, at least, inconsistent
with American citizenship.' "132 In applying this "dilution of alle-
giance" test to these immediate facts, he was able to conclude that a
finding of lack of allegiance to this country had been established.183
In view of Justice Clark's definition of the central issue in expatriation
cases as involving some inquiry into allegiance, it appears that even
the dissenters are narrowing Justice Frankfurter's original "rational
nexus" test.
As these cases-Trop, Mendoza-Martinez, and Schneider-all in-
dicate, the power of Congress to expatriate citizens without their assent
had been sharply limited, although generally on the basis of procedural
considerations. Although the Court had struck down several statutory
provisions declaring specific conduct to result in the loss of American
citizenship, none of these decisions expressly repudiated Perez, nor at-
tempted to redefine Congress' authority to withdraw citizenship.
II. A-FRoyim v. RusK
It was not until Afroyim v. Rus, 34 decided in 1967, that the Su-
preme Court reconsidered the primary issues originally raised in Perez:
Congress' power to expatriate and the nature of the renunciation re-
131. Id. at 169-70 (dissenting opinion).
132. Id. at 175-76 (dissenting opinion); cf. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 60-61
(1958). In actuality, Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority in Perez, main-
tained that the principal issue in expatriation cases was determining whether a rational
nexus existed between Congress' power to regulate foreign affairs and the legislation
enacted to effectuate that power. See notes 83-86 supra & accompanying text. His
reference to dilution of allegiance was clearly dictum.
133. 377 U.S. at 176 (dissenting opinion).
134. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
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quired for loss of citizenship. Afroyim involved a naturalized American
citizen' 35 who had voted in an Israeli political election. As a result, his
application for a United States passport was denied on the ground that
he had expatriated himself, pursuant to section 401 (e) of the Nation-
ality Act of 1940.136 The district court 187 and the court of appeals,e
following Perez v. Brownell, upheld the Government. The Supreme
Court expressly overruled Perez and affirmatively rejected the broad
principle underlying the Perez decision by ruling that Congress can
never deprive an American citizen of his citizenship involuntarily.
Relying principally on legislative history, Justice Black, writing for
the majority in a 5 to 4 decision,1 39 rejected the view espoused in Perez,
that "Congress has any general power, express or implied, to take away
an American citizen's citizenship without his assent."'140 The American
people are sovereign, and the Government cannot unilaterally sever
its relationship to the people by withdrawing the status of citizenship.
Even if such power once existed, a view that Justice Black did not
specifically adopt, it was abolished by the fourteenth amendment, the
same constitutional provision dismissed out-of-hand by the Perez Court.
Although the congressional debates preceding the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment and the expatriation proposals which followed
it conclusively proved to the Court's satisfaction that the fourteenth
amendment's citizenship clause was intended to preclude involuntary
expatriation, the majority conceded that conflicting inferences could
be drawn from the legislative history.141 Consequently, the Court was
forced to assert that, in any event, such expatriations are prohibited
by the explicit language used in the amendment, coupled with the
"principles of liberty and equal justice to all that the entire fourteenth
amendment was adopted to guarantee."'14
The Court cited three additional considerations to buttress its
holding: (1) the importance of the citizenship tie; 143 (2) the perilous
135. Although the record did not expressly establish that Afroyim was a dual
national, the district court assumed that he had acquired Israeli citizenship since he
made no claim that the loss of American citizenship would render him stateless. 250 F.
Supp. 686, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The court of appeals and the Supreme Court also
seemed to assume, without comment, that Afroyim was a dual national.
136. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) (1970).
137. 250 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
138. 361 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1966).
139. Justice Black was joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Fortas, and
Chief Justice Warren.
140. 387 U.S. at 257.
141. Id. at 267.
142. Id.
143. "Citizenship is no light trifle to be jeopardized any moment Congress de-
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consequences of being rendered stateless; 144 and, (3) the inconsistencies
which adhere when a free government involuntarily expatriates its
citizens. 45 Under the majority's analysis, an American citizen has "a
constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free country unless he
voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship."' 46 However, the Court's use
of the phrase "voluntarily relinquishes" and its contention that ex-
patriation is conditioned upon the citizen's "assent was neither de-
fined-nor amplified. 47
The dissent quite properly pointed out that voluntariness is not
a term with a fixed meaning. "[I]t has been employed to describe both
a specific intent to renounce citizenship and the uncoerced commission
of an act conclusively deemed by law to be a relinquishment of citizen-
ship.":' 48 Consequently, because of the majority's lack of verbal pre'
cision, the meaning of Afroyim is uncertain and subject to varying in-
terpretations.
From the ostensible holding that Congress has absolutely, no power
under the fourteenth amendment to divest an American of his citizen-
ship without his assent, many commentators have assumed that the
Court has immunized from expatriation even those citizens whose al-
legiance has clearly shifted. 49 If this is a correct interpretation, Justice
Black would presumably require a specific intent to abandon citizen-
ship before he would find a voluntary expatriation, an intent which
could only be expressed through some explicit and voluntary state-
ment of renunciation. Congress' powers would therefore be limited to
enacting "measures to regulate such abjuration."'8 0
cides to do so under the name of one of its general or implied grants of power." Id.
at 267-68.
144. "In some instances, loss of citizenship can mean that a man is left without
the protection of citizenship in any country in the world-as a man without a coun-
try." Id. at 268.
145. "The very nature of our free government makes it completely incongruous
to have a rule of law under which a group of citizens temporarily in office can deprive
another group of citizens of their citizenship." Id. at 268.
146. Id.
147. As a practical matter, such ambiguous language was perhaps deliberate,
obfuscating the differences among this newly-formed. coalition of Justices. Further-
more, since the issue before the Court was framed to decide only whether there was
a congressional power to strip an American of his citizenship without his assent, any
pronouncement on the meaning of voluntary relinquishment would have been dictum.
148. 387 U.S. at 269 n.1 (dissenting opinion).
149. See, e.g., Comment, Involuntary Expatriation, 81 HA. L. Rav. 126, 137
(1967-68); Comment, supra note 50, at 175.
150. Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 139 (1958) (concurring opinion). Such
"abjuration" was originally provided for in the two formal renunciation sections of
the Nationality Act of 1940. Sections 401(f),(g), 54 Stat. 1168 (1940), as amended,
8 U.S.C. §§ 1481(a)(6),(7) (1970).
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Paradoxically, Justice Black intimated, although he did not ex-
pressly declare such to be the case, that he was adopting Chief Justice
Warren's dissenting opinion in Perez.151 In Perez, however, the Chief
Justice, while recognizing the role that intention plays in expatriation,
conceded that he would allow Congress to classify acts as in derogation
of undivided allegiance to this country, the indisputable effect of which
would be the voluntary abandonment of citizenship. Hence, Justice
Black's favorable citation of Chief Justice Warren's dissent in Perez
may mean that those acts, including, but not limited to, an explicit
renunication, which clearly demonstrate diluted allegiance to this
country, may be deemed as evincing a voluntary relinquishment of
citizenship.
Although Justice Black's lack of verbal precision in dealing with
this issue in Afroyim, even coupled with his approval of Chief Justice
Warren's dissent in Perez, does not necessarily indicate support for
the "dilution of allegiance" test, language to this effect is found in his
concurring opinion in Nishikawa v. Dulles, 52 a case decided the same
day as Perez. In Nishikawa, Justice Black noted that
Congress . .. cannot declare that such equivocal acts as service
in a foreign army, participation in a foreign election or desertion
from our armed forces establish a conclusive presumption of inten-
tion to throw off American nationality.... Of course such conduct
may be highly persuasive evidence in the particular case of a purpose
to abandon citizenship. 153
This language, by specifically referring to "equivocal" acts, might
mean that actions considered to be unequivocal indicators of volun-
tary abandonment may be deemed by Congress as establishing a con-
clusive presumption of intention to renounce one's citizenship.5 4 Con-
ceivably, Justice Black's language might even acknowledge a congres-
sional power to declare certain equivocal acts as establishing a re-
buttable presumption of intention to renounce one's citizenship.
The Afroyim dissent, delivered by Justice Harlan,155 rejected
each of the majority's premises. Justice Harlan contended that the
citizenship clause of the fourteenth amendment serves only the "nar-
151. This was the contention of Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion. 387
U.S. at 269 n.1.
152. 356 U.S. 129 (1958) (concurring opinion).
153. Id. at 139.
154. Comment, An Expatriation Enigma: Afroyim v. Rusk, 48 B.U.L. REv. 295,
302 (1968).
155. Justice Harlan was joined by Justices Clark, Ste.art, and White.
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row, essentially definitional purpose"'u 6 of declaring "to whom citizen-
ship, as a consequence either of birth or naturalizaton, initially at-
taches."'1 7 The assertion by the majority that the effect of the four-
teenth amendment is to preclude Congress' power to expatriate citizens
against their will was deemed "conclusory and quite unsubstanti-
ated."'5 Justice Harlan also claimed that the majority had failed to
overcome the reasoning employed in Perez, that Congress' power to
regulate foreign affairs gives it authority to expatriate any citizen who
voluntarily commits acts prejudicial to United States foreign relations
and which indicate a dilution of allegiance to this country. Justice
Harlan concluded by noting that the majority opinion is an "ipse dixit,
evincing little more . .. than the present majority's own distaste for
the expatriation power."1 59
Although Afroyim v. Rusk is subject to varying, and often con-
tradictory, interpretations, 160 it is a landmark decision. The evolu-
tionary course traveled by the Court which began with Perez and
culminated in Afroyim, has resulted in the elevation of American
citizenship to a preferred status, any impairment of which is to be
strenuously resisted. 61 Although Afroyim presumably stands for the
proposition that a mere rational basis for expatriative legislation will
no longer be a sufficient ground for divesting an American citizen
of his citizenship, to categorize that decision as granting an absolute
right of citizenship which may in no manner be abridged by the
Government, would be an overstatement. Although Justice Black
seemed intent on establishing citizenship as a precious right to be
lost only under extreme circumstances, to view his position as setting
forth the constitutional doctrine that citizenship, once granted, is
completely beyond the power of Congress to revoke is not warranted
considering the imprecise language of Afroyim, the limited reliance on
156. 387 U.S. at 285 (dissenting opinion).
157. Id. at 292.
158. Id. at 268-69.
159. Id. at 293.
160. Some commentators maintain that Afroyim stands for the proposition that
there must be a formal and explicit statement of renunciation before an American is
held to have voluntarily relinquished his citizenship. See, e.g., Comment, supra note
50, at 175; Comment, supra note 149, at 137. Others contend that the correct inter-
pretation of Afroyim is that the performance of certain acts deemed by Congress as
demonstrating diluted allegiance to this country will establish a voluntary relinquish-
ment of citizenship. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 9, at 935-36; Comment, supra
note 154, at 302-03. Probably because the operative effect of Afroyim is so uncertain,
Congress has not yet made any attempt to revise the loss of citizenship provisions of the
present statute.
161. Roche, supra note 40, at 364.
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Chief Justice Warren's dissenting opinion in Perez, and the language
which Justice Black himself used in Nishikawa. The assumption that.
Afroyim grants an absolute right of citizenship would be, moreover,,
even less reasonable to assume today in the light of various post-
Afroyim developments.
III. PosT-AFRoyim DEVELOPMENTS
A. Administrative Developments
The confusion created by Afroyim was apparently shared by then-
Attorney General Ramsey Clark. Pursuant to his authority,1 2 the-
Attorney General, two days before leaving office, issued a Statement
of Interpretation delineating the effect of Afroyirn.10 8 The statement
was designed to aid both the Passport Office of the Department of
State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Depart-
ment of Justice in administering the passport and immigration laws,.
insofar as they involve loss of citizenship. By its own terms, the State-
ment of Interpretation applied to all of the loss-of-nationality provi-
sions in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 and its predeces-
sor statute, the Nationality Act of 1940.64
Clark noted that the crucial question left open by Afroyim was.
the definition of "voluntary relinquishment" and that the decision
did not provide specific guidelines by which he could definitively deter-
mine the validity of the other expatriative sections of the two Acts.
It was the opinion of the Attorney General, however, that "[u]nder
any reading of Afroyim . . . it is clear that an act which does not
reasonably manifest an individual's transfer or abandonment of al-
legiance to the United States cannot be made a basis for expatria-
tion."' 6 5 Clark noted, however, that "voluntary relinquishment" is not
limited to formal, written renunciation; it can also be manifested by
162. Ch. 477, § 103(a), 66 Stat. 173 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)
(1970), provides that while the Secretary of State has jurisdiction to determine the
nationality of persons not in the United States, a determination and ruling by the
Attorney General with respect to all questions of law shall be controlling.
163. 34 Fed. Reg. 1079 (1969).
164. The Statement of Interpretation has no application, however, to a revocation
of naturalization unlawfully procured, and it does not necessarily apply to loss of
United States citizenship as a result of birth abroad to a citizen parent or parents,.
a matter then under litigation. Id. at 1080.
165. Id. at 1079.
[Vol. 25
976] EXPATRIATION 477
other actions statutorily determined to be expatriative, so long as these
actions amount to a derogation of allegiance. 166 However, the Attorney
General asserted that Afroyim permits the individual to raise the issue
of intent, and once that issue is raised, the "not easily satisfied" burden
is on the Government to prove that expatriation has occurred. 6 7
Although the Attorney General did not set forth a section-by-
section analysis of the validity of each expatriation provision of the
Nationality Act of 1940 and the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, he did state that certain types of conduct declared expatriative
would not be sufficient to establish a voluntary relinquishment of
citizenship. For example, Clark indicated that neither employment
as a public school teacher in a foreign country'0 8 nor service in the
armed forces of an allied country 69 would support a finding of loss
of citizenship. On the other hand, an individual's acceptance of an
important political post in a foreign government 7 0 would indicate an
intention to relinquish citizenship, and enlistment in the armed forces
of a foreign government engaged in hostilities against the United
States1 would be "highly persuasive evidence" of an intent to aban-
don American citizenship. 7 2 After qualifying the foregoing examples
as being merely illustrative, the Attorney General directed that ad-
ministrative authorities should decide on a case-by-case basis whether
the individual comes within the terms of an expatriation provision,
and whether that individual has in fact voluntarily relinquished his
citizenship. 73 Substantial differences in interpretation between the De-
partment of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service
were directed to be referred to the Attorney General for final resolu-
tion.
The Attorney General's Statement of Interpretation also directed
the Department of State and the Justice Department to draw up in-
terpretive procedural guidelines for cases involving possible loss of
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1080.
168. Oh. 876, § 401(d), 54 Stat. 1168 (1940), as amended, ch. 477, § 349(a)
<4) (A) & (B), 66 Stat. 267; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481 (a) (4) (A), (B) (1952).
169. Ch. 876, § 401(c), 54 Stat. 1168 (1940), as amended, ch. 477, § 349(a)
<3), 66 Stat. 267; 8 U.S.O. § 1481(a) (3) (1952).
170. Oh. 876, § 401(d), 54 Stat. 1168 (1940), as amended, ch. 477, § 349(a) (4)
(A), (B), 66 Stat. 267; 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (4) (A), (B) (1952).
171. Ch. 876, § 401(c), 54 Stat. 1168 (1940), as amended, ch. 477, § 349(a)
(3), 66 Stat. 267; 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (3) (1952).
172. 34 Fed. Reg. 1080, (1969).
173. Id.
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citizenship.174 These guidelines were subsequently transmitted to all
American diplomatic and consular posts abroad.Y5
Under the State-Justice guidelines, the voluntary performance
of certain acts is considered "highly persuasive evidence" of an inten-
tion to relinquish citizenship and will "normally" result in expatria-
tion absent countervailing evidence of an intent not to transfer or
abandon allegiance to the United States. These acts are: (1) natural-
ization in a foreign state, (2) a meaningful oath of allegiance to a
foreign state, (8) service in the armed forces of a foreign state engaged
in hostilities against the United States, and, (4) service in an important
political post in a foreign government. The voluntary performance,
of the remaining statutory expatriative provisions will not "normally"
result in expatriation, unless the record in the particular case contains
persuasive evidence of an intent by the citizen to transfer his al-
legiance to a foreign state or abandon his allegiance to the United
States. The guidelines also provide that two categories of cases will
be decided by the Department of State and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service on a case-by-case basis. These cases involve: (1)
the voluntary performance of the four specific acts delineated above,
coupled with persuasive evidence of an intent not to transfer or aban-
don allegiance; and, (2) the voluntary performance of other acts
coming under statutory expatriative provisions, coupled with persua-
sive evidence of an intent to transfer or abandon allegiance.
Procedurally, the guidelines direct that every citizen who has al-
legedly performed an act described as expatriative by statute should
be given an opportunity to state fully all of the facts, circumstances,
motives, intentions, and purposes which contributed or led to the
performance of the expatriative act. If the diplomatic or consular
officer believes that the evidence points to expatriation, he is directed
to refer the case to the Department of State for final decision.
Although it is still too early to make a final assessment of the
174. Unlike the Attorney General's Statement of Interpretation, which noted that
it was not necessarily applicable to persons who acquired American citizenship by
birth abroad to a citizen parent or parents, the guidelines explicitly provide that such
citizens will be treated in the same manner as persons who acquired citizenship under
the fourteenth amendment. The guidelines obviously refused to draw a distinction
between fourteenth amendment and non-fourteenth amendment citizens, perhaps in
the belief that the amendment defined the total range of citizenship. The subsequent
decision of the Supreme Court in Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971), would ap-
pear to have negated this belief since the Court recognized a new type of citizenship,
a statutory citizenship, distinguishable from one acquired pursuant to the fourteenth
amendment. See text accompanying notes 194-224 infra.
175. Dep't of State Circular Airgram CA-2855, May 16, 1969.
(Vol. 25
EXPATRIATION
administrative experience with the Attorney General's Statement of
Interpretation and the Department of State-Department of Justice
guidelines, the practical effect to date has certainly been to facilitate
the retention of citizenship. Since the individual's intent to relinquish
his citizenship is the controlling factor in these administrative proceed-
ings, the operation of the expatriation laws will not result in a de-
termination of loss of nationality unless there is persuasive evidence
of an intent to abandon or transfer allegiance.
Although the standards underlying the guidelines have tran-
scended the milder standards employed by the Supreme Court in its
expatriation rulings prior to Afroyim, these administrative determina-
tions have not considered a formal and explicit renunciation as being
the sole means by which a citizen is held to have voluntarily relin-
quished his citizenship, as Justice Black's opinion in Afroyim has often
been interpreted to mean. Rather, the intent in this administrative
context has been "[e]valuated in the light of all the relevant facts and
circumstances in each case, including the statements and conduct of
the individual and third parties with personal knowledge, the credi-
bility of the individual, and the social, economic and political circum-
stances present in the situational context."'176
At the same time, however, the definition of voluntary relinquish-
ment, as employed by the Department of State and the Immigration
Service, is somewhat different from Chief Justice Warren's proposed
"dilution of allegiance" test. The Chief Justice apparently would have
permitted Congress to classify certain acts as in derogation of undivided
allegiance to this country, the "indisputable" effect of which would be
abandonment of citizenship. The Chief Justice would not have permit-
ted an individual to raise lack of intent to relinquish citizenship as a
defense to expatriation, as do the guidelines. Consequently, it can be
said that the guidelines forge a new standard, not as restrictive as Justice
Black's formulation, but more expansive than Chief Justice Warren's
proposal, in regard to Congress' authority to withdraw citizenship.
B. Lower Court Decisions
To date, there have been only five lower court cases which have
applied the rationale and principles of Afroyim. Unfortunately, they
have done little to clarify that decision. Apparently, the lower courts
have been applying a standard similar to that applied by the Depart-
176. Duvall, supra note 58, at 451.
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ment of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service in their
administration of the passport and immigration laws. The commission
of certain specified acts, including, but not limited to, an explicit re-
nunciation of citizenship, which have been declared expatriative be-
cause they are indicative of a transfer of allegiance to another state
when performed with an intent to transfer that allegiance, have been
held to constitute a voluntary relinquishment of citizenship.
In Baker v. Rusk' 7 7 a California district court held that a native-
born American citizen, who was raised and educated in Canada, had
not voluntarily relinquished his citizenship, pursuant to section 2 of
the Immigration Act of 1907,178 by taking an oath of allegiance to the
British sovereign as a condition of admittance to the Canadian bar.
Although the court seemed to assume, without explicitly raising the
issue, that after Afroyim a person could still relinquish his citizenship
through the performance of acts indicating a transfer of allegiance to
another state, as well as by explicit statement, the court found that the
oath of allegiance and the circumstances surrounding the taking of
that oath did not indicate any such intent on the part of the claim-
ant. 79 The court attached particular importance to the fact that
Baker had always cherished his American citizenship and had never
wished to relinquish it; that he was not aware of the consequences
that resulted from his taking of the oath; that, even after taking the
oath, he had never considered himself to be a Canadian citizen nor
had Canadian authorities; and finally, that he had made, apart from
the oath, no expression and performed no act inconsistent with United
States citizenship, such as voting in a Canadian election or serving in
the Canadian armed forces. Thus, although he had performed an act
normally deemed expatriative, the totality of the record indicated no,
intent to transfer allegiance to another state.180
However, in King v. Rogers,'8' the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that a native-born American citizen had voluntarily re-
linquished his citizenship, pursuant to section 349 (a) (1) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act of 1952,182 when he became a natural-
ized British subject. Because King took an oath of allegiance to the
177. 296 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
178. Oh. 2534, § 2, 34 Stat. 1228 (1907).
179. Murphy, Loss of Nationality Under United States Law and Practice: A
Foreign Policy Perspective, 19 KAN. L. REv. 89, 99 (1970).
180. Duvall, supra note 58, at 44-1-42.
181. 463 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1972).
182. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(1) (1970).
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British sovereign in becoming a British subject, expressed his willing-
ness to formally renounce his American citizenship, and disclaimed
liability for service in the United States military forces, the court
determined that the evidence clearly established a voluntary relinquish-
ment of United States citizenship.
In In re Balsamo, s3 an Illinois district court held that a natural-
ized American citizen, who automatically reacquired Italian citizen-
ship upon his return to his native land, had not voluntarily relin-
quished his citizenship, pursuant to section 404 (a) of the Nationality
Act of 1940.184 The provision in question provides that a naturalized
citizen shall lose his citizenship by residing for at least two years in
the state of his birth, or in a state of which he was formerly a national,
if he thereby acquires the nationality of such state. The court ruled
that Balsamo's resumed residence in Italy did not constitute volun-
tary relinquishment of American citizenship, since his reacquisition of
Italian citizenship was automatic in the sense that he did not have
to perform any affirmative act in accepting it.
In Jolley v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, s5 a native-
born citizen had renounced his citizenship, pursuant to section 1481
(a) (6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,18 6 after
losing his student deferment and being reclassified as available for
military service. Jolley had argued that his renunciation was not truly
voluntary, since it was compelled by his moral convictions against
participating in military endeavors. Because his oath of renunciation
itself had been made without duress, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that Jolley had voluntarily relinquished his citizenship.
It is important to remember that the concept of duress is applicable only
to the issue of voluntariness; it is irrelevant to- the issue of intent to
relinquish citizenship, except in the sense that the question of intent
will not be reached until after a determination of voluntariness has
been made.187 In fact, if the evidence fully supports a claim of in-
voluntariness, then the issue of intent will never be reached at all.
The court of appeals rejected the argument that Jolley's abhorrence
of the Selective Service laws and his refusal to serve in the military
constituted legal duress so as to render his formal renunciation in-
183. 306 F. Supp. 1028 (N.D. IIl. 1969).
184. Ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1170 (1940), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1484 (1970).
185. 441 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1971).
186. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (6) (1970).
187. Duvall, supra note 58, at 449.
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voluntary""" It is not unlikely that the court theorized that if formal
renunciation without a finding of duress were not to be treated as an
act of expatriation, then the concept of expatriation would be ren-
dered meaningless and the courts would be deprived of any workable
standards by which they could decide whether an individual had in
fact voluntarily relinquished his citizenship.8 "
Certainly, an explicit renunciation would constitute a voluntary
relinquishment of citizenship under Chief Justice Warren's "dilution
of allegiance" test, since his formulation is satisfied by the commission
of certain specified conduct-for example, an oath of renunciation-
that manifests a voluntary transfer or abandonment of allegiance. By
focusing exclusively on the issue of voluntariness, and refusing to in-
quire into Jolley's subjective intent in making his formal renuncia-
tion, the court's interpretation also seems consistent with even the most
restrictive view of Congress' power to enact expatriative legislation.
Although it is debatable whether Justice Black would have required
specific intent as an element of the voluntary relinquishment of citizen-
ship necessary for expatriation, it is doubtful whether even he would
have found fault with an interpretation of voluntary relinquishment
that gives legal recognition to the voluntary execution of a formal
oath of renunciation'90
In Peter v. Secretary of State,"" the most recently decided case
interpreting the Afroyim decision, the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit held that the acts of Peter were not so in-
consistent with the retention of American citizenship as to result in
loss of that status under section 349 (a) (4) (A) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952.192 Peter was a naturalized American
citizen who had married a Hungarian citizen and who, on joining her
husband in Hungary, had registered with the Hungarian police as an
American citizen, worked for Hungarian radio, toured Japan twice on
Hungarian passports, and subsequently traveled to the United States
on a Hungarian passport. The court reasoned that her conduct did
188.
Dislike for the law does not in and of itself compose coercion ....
[h]bile we comprehend Jolley's argument and contention concerning his
plight, so long as the draft remains a valid obligation of citizenship, it can-
not constitute legal duress.
441 F.2d at 1250-51.
189. Comment, supra note 12, at 1541.
190. It is, of course, quite possible that Justice Black never even contemplated
the argument made by Jolley.
191. 347 F. Supp. 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
192. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(4)(A) (1970).
[Vol. 25
EXPATRIATION
not unequivocally indicate relinquishment of American citizenship in
favor of allegiance to some foreign state since it was not her intention
to transfer that allegiance. 193
C. Rogers v. Bellei
In Rogers v. Bellei,194 the Supreme Court, in a 5 to 4 decision, 195
departed sharply from its earlier trend in loss of nationality cases by
upholding the constitutionality of section 301 (b) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952.196 Section 301 (b) provides that a person
who has acquired his nationality by descent loses that nationality un-
less he spends at least five years continually in the United States be-
tween the ages of 14 and 28. Although the decision does not expressly
overrule Afroyim, it significantly limits its scope, and suggests that the
Court, in the future, will not be entirely receptive to challenges made
to the expatriation laws.
Bellei was born in Italy in 1939 to an Italian father and a native-
born American mother. By law, he acquired at birth dual nationality:
Italian, because of his birth in Italy,19 7 and American, because of his
mother's citizenship. 198 Although Bellei visited the United States for
brief periods on five separate occasions, he never satisfied the five-year
continual residency requirement. On each of his visits to the United
States, he was expressly notified of the impact of section 301 (b).
Finally, when Bellei applied for an American passport in 1966, he was
informed by the American consul in Rome that he was no longer an
American citizen.
Bellei instituted an action against the Secretary of State, asking
that the Secretary be enjoined from carrying out and enforcing section
193. 347 F. Supp. at 1038.
194. 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
195. Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Chief
Justice Burger, and Justices Harlah, Stewart, and White. Justice Black wrote a dis-
senting opinion, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall. Justice Brennan filed a dis-
senting opinion in which Justice Douglas joined.
196. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1970).
197. 401 U.S. at 818.
198. Ch. 477, § 301(a), 66 Stat. 235 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)
(1970), provides that the following shall be nationals and citizens of the United
States at birth:
(7) a person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its
outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other
a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person,
was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions
for a period or periods totalling not less than ten years, at least five
of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years ....
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301 (b). He also requested a declaratory judgment that section 301 (b)
was unconstitutional as violative of the fifth amendment's due process
clause, the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause,
and the ninth amendment, and that he was and always had been a
native-born American citizen.
A three-judge district court in the District of Columbia sustained
Bellei's motion for summary judgment, holding section 301 (b) un-
constitutional on the grounds that Congress had created a "second
class citizenship" in violation of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment and had gone beyond its powers in denying an individual
his citizenship against his will.199 The court based its decision on the
"[B]road teaching of Afroyim and Schneider ... that once American
citizenship has been recognized or conferred, Congress may not remove
the status; it is for the citizen to abandon his citizenship voluntarily."200
Upon appeal by the Government, the Supreme Court reversed
the decision of the three-judge district court. In so doing, the Court
upheld a loss of citizenship statute for only the second time since Perez
-v. Brownell.201 The majority held that Congress has the power to im-
pose the condition subsequent of residence in this country upon for-
eign-born citizens who do not come within the fourteenth amend-
ment's definition of citizens as those "born or naturalized in the United
States."202 The Court further held that the imposition was not un-
reasonable, arbitrary, or unlawful and thus not violative of the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. In essence, the Court declined
to extend the holdings in Schneider and Afroyim to the facts in Bellei,
embracing instead a very narrow, plain-meaning construction of the
citizenship clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In Schneider the Court relied on the due process clause of the
fifth amendment in holding unconstitutional a statutory distinction
.between native-born and naturalized citizens. Although the Court
made an oblique reference to the citizenship clause of the fourteenth
-amendment,203 the crux of the decision was "[t]hat the rights of
citizenship of the native-born and of the naturalized person are of the
199. Bellei v. Rusk, 296 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1969).
200. Id. at 1252.
201. In Marks v. Esperdy, 377 U.S. 214 (1964), aff'g 315 F.2d 673 (24t Cir.
1963), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of section 349(a) (3) of the 1952
Act, which provided for the expatriation of a person who served in the armed forces of a
foreign state without the prior consent of the United States secretaries of State and
Defense. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (3) (1970).
202. 401 U.S. at 827.
203. 377 U.S. 163, 166 (1964).
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same dignity and are coextensive."204 A persuasive argument can be
made that the decision of the court focused not so much on Schneider's
status as a naturalized citizen but on the fact that she was a citizen
and, as such, entitled to the guarantees of due process. 20 5
In Afroyim the Court relied exclusively on the citizenship clause
of the fourteenth amendment, concluding that Congress was precluded
from expatriating an American absent voluntary relinquishment of
citizenship. Although it is arguable that Afroyim does not stand for
the principle that citizenship is completely immune from congres-
sional regulation, it certainly stands for the proposition that citizen-
ship once conferred cannot be unilaterally revoked by Congress with-
out at least inquiring into the individual's intent to transfer his al-
legiance to another country. It is also clear that Afroyim interprets
the fourteenth amendment as defining the total range of citizenship:
a non-fourteenth amendment citizen simply does not exist under the
Court's formulation.20 6
In Bellei the Court distinquished Sthneider and Afroyim by limit-
ing them to persons acquiring citizenship under the fourteenth amend-
ment. The Court noted that while Schneider and Afroyim had ac-
quired their citizenship by naturalization "in" the United States, Bellei
had neither been born nor naturalized "in" the United States. In the
Court's view, therefore, the citizenship clause had no application to
Bellei. "He simply is not a Fourteenth-Amendment-first-sentence citi-
zen." 207 Since he was not a "Fourteenth-Amendment-first-sentence
citizen," the Court held that he was not entitled to the protection
which that amendment mandates.
Prior to Bellei, it had long been assumed that there were only
two types of citizenship: that obtained by birth within the United
States, and that obtained through naturalization granted by Congress
pursuant to its power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization. 20°
It had also been generally assumed that citizenship by descent (jus
sanguinis) was a form of naturalization, and therefore equal in quality
to citizenship acquired by birth within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States. 20 9 In Bellei, however, the Court drew a distinction
204. Id. at 165.
205. See Comment, Rogers v. Bellei, 13 HIv. INT'L L.J. 151, 157 (1972).
206. See Comment, The Erosion of Citizenship: Rogers v. Bellei, 5 LOYOLA OF-
L.A. L. REv. 589, 602-03 (1972).
207. 401 U.S. at 827.
208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
209. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702-03 (1898); Elk v-
Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 101-02 (1884); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wail.) 162,
167 (1875).
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between naturalization within the United States and citizenship ac-
quired by descent outside the United States. In effect, the Court
recognized a new type of citizenship, a statutory citizenship distinguish-
able from one acquired pursuant to the fourteenth amendment.
After distinguishing Afroyim and Schneider-by characterizing
the former as grounded on the reading of the first sentence of the
fourteenth amendment and by pointing out that although the latter
was a fifth amendment due process case, by a "process of after-the-fact
osmosis," 210 Schneider was also a fourteenth amendment citizen-the
Court next attempted to delineate the proper limits upon Congress'
power to condition statutory citizenship. By noting that the "proper
emphasis is on what the statute permits [Bellei] to gain from the pos-
sible starting point of noncitizenship, not on what he claims to lose
from the possible starting point of full citizenship to which he has no
constitutional right in the first place, '2 11 the Court reasoned that for
constitutional purposes there is no distinction between a condition
preceding the granting of citizenship and a condition subsequent limit-
ing a grant of citizenship already conferred.212 The Court next focused
on the fact that since Congress has an interest in solving the problems
attendant to dual nationality and resulting divided loyalty, it may con-
dition citizenship in any manner so long as such procedures are not
unreasonable, arbitrary, unlawful, or unconstitutional.218
In a stinging dissent, Justice Black criticized the majority's tech-
nical reading of the fourteenth amendment. He argued that the word
"naturalized" is a generic term referring to any means of obtaining
citizenship dependent upon an act of Congress. Consequently, Bellei's
status as a citizen is protected from congressional efforts to remove it
without his consent by the citizenship clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Reiterating his position that citizenship cannot be terminated
unless the individual affected so "intends or desires,"2 14 Justice Black
contended that since Bellei had never voluntarily relinquished his
citizenship, the majority, by upholding section 301 (b), had pro tanto
overruled the constitutional principles declared in Afroyim.21 r
The Court's position that Bellei was not a "Fourteenth-Amend-
ment-first-sentence citizen" obviously imposes a limitation on the scope
210. 401 U.S. at 827.
211. Id. at 836.
212. Id. at 834.
213. Id. at 833.
214. Id. at 838 (dissenting opinion).
215. Id. at 845.
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of the citizenship clause, which is inconsistent with the holding in
Afroyim. The scope of the Afroyim rule against involuntary expa-
triation is affirmatively limited to native-born citizens and citizens
naturalized in the United States. In fact, the Court's reasoning would
seem to indicate that foreign-born children of two American parents
are non-fourteenth amendment citizens, since they acquire their citizen-
ship at birth and abroad, and not by naturalization. 16 Since the Court
has determined that there is no distinction between conditions prece-
dent and subsequent, the only obstacle to congressional limitations on
this class of citizens is the easily satisfied due process requirement of
reasonableness. 217
More important, though, than the Court's recognition of a new
category of citizenship are the questions left unanswered by Bellei.
First, since the Bellei Court did not take the opportunity either to
affirm or to overrule Afroyim, the extent of Congress' power to ex-
patriate a citizen against his will has been left unsettled.218 Second,
since the Court based its holding on its classification of Bellei as a
non-fourteenth amendment citizen, it did not decide whether a con-
ceptual distinction exists between expatriation on the one hand and
the use of conditions subsequent on the other. The Court's decision
therefore does little to clarify the issue of whether Congress has the
power to impose a condition subsequent upon fourteenth amendment
citizens.2 19 Third, since the Court has determined that Congress may
use its power to conduct foreign affairs as the basis for destroying a
conditional grant of citizenship, the ghost of the "rational nexus" test
would appear to be raised once again. Finally, the limited reading
given by the Court to the citizenship clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment would seem to call into question the scope and import of other
constitutional provisions. 220
216. See Comment, Rogers v. Bellei, 85 HAtv. L. REv. 64, 67 n.25 (1971). The
residing requirement of section 301(b) would not, however, apply to such children.
217. If there is no conceptual distinction between conditions precedent and sub-
sequent, Congress may well restrict a foreign-born citizen's rights in many ways un-
foreseen by the Court. For example, statutory citizens might be required to take a
loyalty oath or be prohibited from travelling to countries engaged in hostilities against
the United States as independent conditions for the acquisition or retention of Amer-
ican citizenship. Note, Problems of the Foreign-Born Citizen: Rogers v. Bellei, 11
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 304, 316 (1972).
218. Comment, supra note 216, at 72.
219. Id.
220. The privileges and immunities clause provides that "[n]o State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. If foreign-born children of American
citizens are excluded from the scope of the citizenship clause, it should necessarily
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What is certain, however, is that Rogers v. Bellei represents a
sharp departure from the prior trend in citizenship cases and a decided
policy change on the part of the Court. After striving to preserve
American citizenship from congressional interference for a period of
more than ten years, the citizenship of one American citizen has been
revoked on highly technical and suspicious grounds. "The concept of
a hierarchy of citizenship, apparently overruled by Schneider, has been
revived."221 And the interpretation of Afroyim granting an absolute
right of citizenship has been firmly and unequivocably rejected.22 2
Whether the import of Bellei has so weakened the underpinnings of
Afroyim that the latter decision has been "pro tanto" overruled, as
Justice Black contended, remains to be seen. With the exception of
one decision not even directly on point,223 the federal courts have
neither applied nor interpreted the principles underlying Bellei. The
decision, however, is not one that the Supreme Court is likely to
reverse soon.
224
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Recent administrative and judicial developments have both clari-
fied and obfuscated the principles and doctrines which underlie the
law of expatriation. The Supreme Court has expressly eliminated
certain statutory provisions as grounds for expatriation. No longer may
follow that they are also excluded from protection under the privileges and immunities
clause since that clause relies upon the citizenship clause definition of citizenship.
Comment, Rogers v. Bellei, 24 VAND. L. Rzv. 1257, 1263-64- (1971).
221. Note, supra note 217, at 316.
222. "We do not accept ... that [the holdings in Schneider and Afroyim] are
now to be judicially extended to citizenship not based upon the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and to make citizenship an absolute." 401 U.S. at 835.
223. See Palomo v. Mitchell, 361 F. Supp. 455 (S.D. Tex. 1972). A Texas dis-
trict court held that the 1952 enactment of § 301(a) (7), as amended, 8 U.S.C. §
1401(a) (7) (1970), which liberalized the derivative citizenship requirement by pro.
viding for five years of residence in the United States by a parent after attaining the
age of 14 years and prior to the birth of the citizenship-seeking child, did not apply
retroactively to persons born before its effective date. See note 198 infra. Prior to the
1952 enactment of § 301 (a) (7), a parent was required to have had five years of resi-
dence in the United States after attaining the age of sixteen years and prior to the
birth of the citizenship-seeking child. Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 201(g), 54
Stat. 1138.
224. The composition of the Supreme Court has changed somewhat since Bellei
was decided. Justice Harlan, a member of that five-man majority, Justice Black, the
author of the dissenting opinion, and Justice Douglas, a member of that four-man dis-
sent, have been replaced by Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. Although it
is mere speculation, it appears unlikely that the three new Justices, all of whom are
considered to be conservative in their judicial attitudes, will join with the remaining
dissenters in Bellei, Justices Marshall and Brennan, to form a new majority to over-
turn that decision.
[Vol. 25
EXPATRIATION
a native-born or naturalized citizen lose his citizenship by virtue' of
a court-martial conviction and discharge from the armed forces for
desertion during wartime,22 5 nor by departing from or remaining out-
side of the United States during wartime for the purpose of evading
military training and service.226 A naturalized citizen may no longer
be considered to have expatriated himself by residing abroad for a
certain period of time in the foreign state of his birth.227
Although ostensibly only holding unconstitutional a statutory pro-
vision which provided for withdrawal of citizenship for voting in a
foreign political election, Afroyim v. Rusk228 culminated a decade-long
trend towards limiting Congress' power to expatriate by laying down
the broad doctrine that an American citizen has "a constitutional
right to remain a citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily re-
lincjuishes that citizenship."229 Confusion and misunderstanding-have
followed the case. Although the Afroyim decision was once thought to
have completely nullified each of the loss of nationality provisions of
the Nationality Act of 1940230 and the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952,231 with the exception of the two formal renunciation pro-
visions of the two Acts, subsequent administrative interpretations and
lower court decisions seem to indicate that Afroyim merely modified
the remaining expatriation sections.
It has been thought that the commission of certain specified acts
which Congress has deemed as evincing a dilution of allegiance will
subject a citizen to loss of citizenship, provided that those acts have
been performed voluntarily and absent persuasive evidence that they
have been performed with no intent to transfer or abandon allegiance
to the United States. However, the Supreme Court's decision in Rogers
v. Belle2 32 has again thrown the entire law of expatriation into a state
of flux. By refusing to clear up the confusion surrounding the term
"voluntary relinquishment" the status of the law of voluntary expa-
triation remains clouded.2 33 And by declaring that only "first-sentence-
Fourteenth-Amendment citizens" are protected from congressional
225. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
226. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
227. See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
228. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
229. Id. at 268.
230. Ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137-74 (1940).
231. Oh. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1970).
232. 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
233. It is quite possible that the Court's refusal in Bellei to clarify the meaning
of "voluntary relinquishment" was deliberate. The Court may simply be awaiting a
more appropriate case before attempting to develop a workable definition of that term.
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efforts to divest them of citizenship without their consent, the Court
has limited the scope of the Afroyim holding against involuntary ex-
patriation to native-born and naturalized citizens. Those citizens who
derive their status from a statutory congressional grant may henceforth
be expatriated against their will, subject only to considerations of due
process.
Although the Bellei majority claimed that statutorily based citizen-
ship is not "second-class citizenship," 234 the effect of the decision, as
the minority pointed out, will obviously be to deprive a certain group
of citizens of the full protection of the Constitution.285 The Court's
recognition of a new class of citizenship-a citizenship conferred by the
statutory power of Congress-necessarily creates a halfway status be-
tween alienage and citizenship based upon the first sentence of the
fourteenth amendment.28 6 The priceless right of citizenship certainly
deserves more protection. 2 7 Since the Supreme Court is not likely to
reverse its decision in Bellei soon, it is suggested that an appropriate
congressional response would be most welcome. Congress should choose
between, (1) conferring unconditional citizenship at birth to all for-
eign-born children of an American parent by eliminating the condi-
tion subsequent of section 301 or, (2) denying such children citizen-
ship outright by forcing them either to satisfy the naturalization re-
quirements and quota restrictions placed on other immigrants or,
perhaps, by extending to them a preferred right to immigrate. Regard-
less of the choice made by Congress, the effect would be to proclaim,
as well it should, that the first sentence of the fourteenth amendment
defines the total range of American citizenship.
JONATHAN D. FACTOR
234. 401 U.S. at 835-36.
235. Id. at 838 (dissenting opinion).
236. Comment, supra note 205, at 161.
237. In fact, the Court has several times declared that citizenship is a funda-
mental right. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, where the Court argued that: "As long as a
person does not voluntarily renounce or abandon his citizenship . .. his fundamental
right of citizenship is secure." 356 U.S. 86, 93 (1958) (emphasis added). See also
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267-68 (1967); Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64
(1958) (dissenting opinion).
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